Write your name here		
Surname	Other	names
Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level	Centre Number	Candidate Number
History International Advanced Paper 4: International Stu Option 1D: The Cold War		
Wednesday 13 June 2018 - Time: 2 hours	- Afternoon	Paper Reference WHI04/1D
You must have: Extracts Booklet (enclosed)		Total Marks

#### **Instructions**

- Use **black** ink or ball-point pen.
- **Fill in the boxes** at the top of this page with your name, centre number and candidate number.
- Answer Question 1 in Section A and **ONE** question in Section B.
- Answer the questions in the spaces provided
  - there may be more space than you need.

#### Information

- The total mark for this paper is 50.
- The marks for **each** question are shown in brackets
  - use this as a guide as to how much time to spend on each question.

#### **Advice**

- Read each question carefully before you start to answer it.
- Check your answers if you have time at the end.

Turn over ▶





# **SECTION A**

# Answer Question 1. Write your answer in the space provided.

	Study Extracts 1 and 2 in the Extracts Booklet before you answer this question.				
1	How far do you agree with the view that General MacArthur was mainly responsible for widening the war in Korea after South Korea had been retaken in September 195				
	Explain your answer using Extracts 1 and 2 and your knowledge of the historical context.				
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#### **SECTION B**

#### **Answer ONE question in Section B.**

You must start your answer to your chosen question on the next page.

#### **EITHER**

2 How similar were the key features of the First Vietnam War (1946-54) to the key features of the Malayan 'Emergency' (1948-60)?

(Total for Question 2 = 25 marks)

#### OR

How far do you agree that the main cause of the major escalation in US involvement in Vietnam under President Johnson was the Gulf of Tonkin incident?

(Total for Question 3 = 25 marks)

Inc	Indicate which question you are answering by marking a cross in the box ⊠. If you change your mind, put a line through the box ⊠ and then indicate your new question with a cross ⊠.				
Cho	sen question number:	Question 2	X	Question 3	





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TOTAL FOR SECTION B = 25 MARKS
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TOTAL FOR PAPER = 50 MARKS



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# **Pearson Edexcel**

**International Advanced Level** 

# **History**

**International Advanced** 

**Paper 4: International Study with Historical Interpretations** Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

Wednesday 13 June 2018 - Afternoon

**Extracts Booklet** 

Paper Reference

**WHI04/1D** 

Do not return this booklet with the question paper.

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#### Extracts for use with Section A.

**Extract 1:** From B Catchpole, *The Korean War*, published in 2001.

On 15 October, President Truman and General MacArthur met on Wake Island in the Pacific Ocean to discuss the progress of the war. Truman had never met the General who seemed to be running the war in Korea with minimal reference to the UN, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or his President. Although Truman was Commander-in-Chief he did not get a salute from MacArthur when they met.

The meeting went well. MacArthur assured Truman that the war would be over by Christmas; troops would remain at least until democratic elections could be held for the whole of Korea. Truman wondered what would happen if the Chinese or the Russians entered the war. MacArthur was dismissive of both possibilities. He assured the President that his plans for the gradual occupation of North Korea would allay any fears expressed by Stalin and Mao. Only South Korean troops would be stationed along the Yalu River border. The Chinese, surely, would not object to that.

Truman was impressed by MacArthur's reading of the military situation. On 16 October, he told the American people that there was 'complete unity' between him and General MacArthur; that they were lucky to have the right man, in the right place at the right time. This praise and apparent approval convinced MacArthur that he had a free hand in Korea; he felt at liberty to change his orders. He would advance to the Yalu. There was some confusion among the Joint Chiefs as to whether MacArthur's discussions with the President justified such actions but they let the point pass.

**Extract 2:** From D Clayton James, *MacArthur and the Korean War*, published in 2001.

MacArthur was not involved in the decision-making responsible for unleashing the United Nations forces' invasion of North Korea, which in turn, brought Communist China into the conflict – the only two significant escalations of the Korean War. MacArthur's troops crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea on 1 October 1950, only after he received a Joint Chief's directive four days earlier authorising such a move. And on 7 October, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution that, in essence, called for the reunification of Korea by force.

In many studies, MacArthur is still portrayed as unilaterally deciding to conquer North Korea. In truth, MacArthur merely executed the policy made in Washington to seize North Korea, which turned out to be perhaps the most important decision of the war and produced the only escalation that brought a new belligerent force into the conflict. To find the decision-makers behind this startling change in policy, one must look to the Truman administration in Washington, not MacArthur's office in Tokyo.

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